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The 2016 edition of IEC 61511-1: 2016 added two new requirements regarding the security of 
safety instrumented systems (SIS).  The first requirement states that “a security risk assessment 
shall be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities of the SIS” and the second requirement 
states that “the design of the SIS shall be such that it provides the necessary resilience against the 
identified security risks”.  The standard directs the reader to ISA TR84.00.09, ISO/IEC 
27001:2013, and IEC 62443-2-1:2010 for further guidance on how to comply with these 
requirements.  While these documents are informative, the 479 combined pages do not provide 
concise guidance on how to address the specific security requirements.  The purpose of this 
paper is to offer step-by-step guidance on how to address the security requirements in 61511 and 
to identify specific clauses in the reference standards for further information.   
Why the Requirement for a Security Risk Assessment? 
ISA/IEC 61511 is a functional safety standard which historically focused on random or 
systematic failures that could impact the ability of the safety instrumented system (SIS) to 
properly respond to a process demand.  So why did the authors of 61511 add these new 
requirements for security assessments?  The primary reason is that industries and governments 
now recognize that security threats, both physical and cyber, could significantly impact the 
integrity and availability of a SIS and that functional safety assessments do not historically 
address security threats such as physical sabotage or cyber-attacks (e.g. malware, hacking, etc.).  
This is particularly true for programmable electronic SIS with network communications. In other 
words, just because a SIS is SIL rated does not mean it is immune to physical or cyber threats.  
Without performing a security risk assessment of a SIS, asset owners/operators may have a false 
sense of security regarding the safety of their operations. 
Recent events have heightened the urgency of performing security risk assessments on SIS.  
Since 2010 there have been numerous publicized incidents regarding intentional attacks on 
industrial control systems (ICS) and SIS in critical infrastructure around the world.  For example, 
the Stuxnet virus in 2010, the Shamoon virus in 2013, the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 
2015 and 2016, and the Triton Malware targeted at a SIS in the Middle East in 2017. 
The of Definition of Risk 
Many people struggle with the term risk and what it means and what it doesn’t mean.  So, let’s 
start with some definitions.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines risk as “(exposure to) the 
possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance; a chance or situation 
involving such a possibility” (Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed. ). This is good but it is a little 
too general. In risk analysis, risk is traditionally defined as a function of probability and impact 
where the probability is the likelihood of an event occurring and impact is a measure of the 
extent of the adverse circumstance (i.e. the consequence).  The common formulaic way of 
expressing this is:  
 
This is also a good definition, but again, a little too general for applications where we want to 
assess security risk, particularly information security risk.   
Security Risk 
The thing many people struggle with when attempting to assess security risk, which is typically 
based on intentional actions, is that it is very difficult to estimate likelihood.  In fact, I have heard 
people argue that it is impossible to assess security or cyber security risk because it is impossible 
to estimate the likelihood of a deliberate action.  While I agree it’s challenging, I disagree that it 
is impossible and fortunately most security professionals would agree with me.  Otherwise, how 
would those responsible for national security or the security of major events such as the Olympic 
Games even begin their undertaking without some method of assessing security risk?   
Actually, the solution to the “likelihood conundrum” actually quite simple.  In the field of 
security risk analysis the likelihood component is broken down into its core elements: threats and 
vulnerabilities. The common formulaic way expressing this is: 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Special Publication 800-30 Revision 1: 
Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments., 2012) explains this well by stating, “Risk is a function 
of the likelihood of a given threat-source exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and the 
resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization.”  
In addition to NIST, another organization called the FAIR Institute has developed a model for 
understanding, analyzing and quantifying cybersecurity and operational risk called the Factor 
Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) framework.  The FAIR framework factors security risk into 
its elements making it easier to understand and more practical to assess. Figure 1 is a visual of 
the FAIR model that is provided by the FAIR Institute.  As you can see, the model dissects 
likelihood (which FAIR calls loss event frequency) into Threat Event Frequency and 
Vulnerability.  Sound familiar?  The FAIR model further breaks down Threat Event Frequency 
into Contact Frequency and Probability of Action.  Finally, Vulnerability is broken down into 
Threat Capability and Resistive Strength.   
As you can see, it not impossible to assess cybersecurity risk.  You simply need a good 
framework, methodology and guidance to get started.   
 
Figure 1: The FAIR Risk Model, Fair Institute, 2018 (cdn) 
The 61511 Security Clauses 
Now that we have established a good definition of security risk and its major components, let’s 
take a deeper look at the security clauses in IEC 61511.  Clause 8.2.4 states that a security risk 
assessment shall be carried out.  It is followed by 6 sub-clauses that further specify the required 
elements of a security risk assessment.   
If you read through clause 8.2.4 you will see that it requires the basic elements in a security risk 
assessment.  For example, clause 8.2.4a requires that one define the scope of the assessment (i.e. 
the system under consideration) which is the SIS and any device connected to the SIS.  Defining 
the scope is the first step in any security risk assessment methodology.  Clause 8.2.4b requires 
identifying and describing threats and vulnerabilities while clause 8.2.4c requires a description 
of the potential consequences resulting from the security events and the likelihood of these 
events occurring.  Clause 8.2.4.d states that the security risk assessment shall provide 
consideration of various system lifecycle phases such as design, implementation, commissioning, 
operation, and maintenance.  Clause 8.2.4e states that the security risk assessment shall result in 
the determination of requirements for additional risk reduction.  In other words, it shall define 
additional physical or cyber security countermeasures that will reduce the risk to tolerable levels.  
Lastly, clause 8.2.4f requires a description of, or references to information on, the measures 
taken to reduce or remove the threats.  This, effectively is the documentation of existing or 
proposed security countermeasures.  A security countermeasure is an action, device, procedure, 
or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by 
minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can 
be taken (Countermeasure_Computer, n.d.).  
Clause 11.2.12 simply states that the design of the SIS shall be such that it provides the 
necessary resilience against the identified security risks and refers the reader back to clause 
8.2.4. 
Additional Guidance 
61511 clause 8.2.4 refers the reader to several standards for additional guidance (ISA 
TR84.00.09 and IEC 62443-2-1:2010).  These documents can be helpful as they are aligned with 
general security risk assessment frameworks but incorporate the unique requirements of 
industrial automation and control system (IACS) and SIS applications.  Another document that 
was not referenced but is a valuable resource is ISA 62443-3-2:2018 CDV, “Security for 
industrial automation and control systems – Part 3-2: Security Risk Assessment and Design”.  
The reason it was not referenced is that it was not available at the time that IEC 61511 second 
edition was published in 2016.  This standard has been approved by both ISA and IEC and is 
currently being prepared for publication.  It establishes requirements for: 
• defining a system under consideration (SUC) for an industrial automation and control 
system (IACS);  
• partitioning the SUC into zones and conduits; 
• assessing risk for each zone and conduit;  
• establishing security level target (SL-T) for each zone and conduit; and 
• documenting the security requirements. 
How to Perform a Security Risk Assessment on a SIS 
So, all of this background information and guidance is great but how do you actually perform a 
security risk assessment on an SIS? The answer is you need to select a security risk assessment 
methodology that has been tailored towards assessing ICS and SIS applications.  The risk 
management frameworks and discussed thus far (e.g. NIST, FAIR, etc.) apply generally to 
assessing cyber security and information security risk. They are, as their names imply, 
frameworks that define the core elements.  They are not, however, methodologies.  A 
methodology is a body of methods rules and postulates employed by discipline or, in other 
words, it is a particular procedure or set of procedures.   
One methodology that that has emerged from all of the aforementioned standards and guidance is 
something known as a cyber PHA or cyber HAZOP.   
Cyber PHA Methodology 
A cyber PHA is a detailed cybersecurity risk assessment methodology for ICS & SIS that 
conforms to ISA/IEC 62443-3-2. The name, cyber PHA, was given to this method because it is 
similar to the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) or the hazard and operability study (HAZOP) 
methodology that is popular in process safety management, particularly in industries that operate 
highly hazardous industrial processes (e.g. oil and gas, chemical, etc.). 
A cyber PHA is typically performed in phases.  Figure 2 depicts a typical cyber PHA risk 
assessment process.  The process is scalable and can be applied to individual systems, or to entire 
facilities or even entire enterprises.  It all depends upon the scope of the assessment which, if 
you’ll recall, is the first sub-clause in IEC 61511 8.2.4a.  In this paper we will focus on applying 
this methodology to the assessment of an SIS.  
 
Figure 2:  Example of a cyber PHA Risk Assessment Process 
The Six Phases of a Cyber PHA applied to a SIS 
1. Kickoff: Kicking off a project effectively puts both the site personnel and the assessment 
team on the same page with regard to project expectations, data exchange requirements and 
schedule.  The kickoff is also where the scope of the assessment is established which the first 
requirement in 61511 Clause 8.2.4a.  A successful kickoff meeting allows all personnel to 
discuss the current cyber posture of the facility based on existing policies, roles and 
responsivities, and the SIS components and architecture. Setting expectations on information 
requirements allows subsequent phases to progress efficiently.  
2. Assess: The purpose of this phase is to gather information about the SIS and its 
connections to identify vulnerabilities.  This phase satisfies the remainder of the requirements in 
61511 Clauses 8.2.4a and 8.2.4b by documenting the SIS and its connections and identifying 
vulnerabilities. This is best performed through a site visit by the assessment team as it provides 
an opportunity to document data flows, equipment configurations, as-built system architecture, 
and to interview onsite engineering, operations and maintenance personnel. It is important that 
only non-invasive techniques be used during this visit as it is critical that the normal operation of 
the SIS not be interrupted or altered in any way.  
Some vulnerability assessments techniques only involve interviewing site personnel and 
completing a questionnaire.  In our opinion, such an exercise is inadequate when assessing the 
security of a system with health, safety and environmental consequences.  Failure to assess the 
actual details of the physical attributes of a SIS and all of its connections (both physical and 
logical) jeopardizes missing critical information necessary to truly determine risk.  
The site visit also provides an opportunity to perform a gap assessment providing valuable 
insight into the site’s position in relation to compliance with relevant functional safety and 
cybersecurity standards such as IEC 61511, ISA/IEC 62443, and the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework. This is valuable as a means of measuring progress as a cybersecurity program 
moves forward and also to benchmark against best industry practices. 
3. Analyze: Analyzing the data acquired during the site visit, as well as any other 
information collected during the project allows the team to document potential vulnerabilities 
that may be exploited during a cyber event.  These may include physical security gaps noted 
during the site visit, undocumented connections, unsecure protocols, misconfigured devices, 
weak access controls, anomalous communications captured during network traffic analysis, or 
vulnerable software found during computer analysis. These vulnerabilities are documented and 
used as part of the cyber PHA workshop on Phase 4 to ensure scenarios considered are valid. 
During analysis, markups to the architecture diagram can be made in order to document the 
actual current state of the ICS. This is critical for use in the Cyber PHA Workshop so all 




















Scope of Assessment  
 
Figure 3: Example of Logical Network Diagram of Depicting the SIS and Connected Devices 
4. Cyber PHA Workshop: The cyber PHA workshop is the heart of the process,  where all 
of the information gathered and analyzed in Phases 1 – 3 is integrated with threat scenarios to 
develop a complete picture of risk.  This phase satisfies the requirements in 61511 Clauses 
8.2.4b, 8.2.4c, 8.2.4e and 8.2.4f by identifying and documenting threats, vulnerabilities, existing 
countermeasures, likelihood, consequences and recommendations for additional countermeasures 
for additional risk reduction. 
The workshop is a group effort led by a facilitator and a scribe with expertise in the cyber PHA 
process as well as multiple subject matter experts who are familiar with the industrial process, 
the SIS and related ICS and IT systems. For example, the workshop team typically includes 
representatives from operations, engineering, IT and health and safety as well as an independent 
facilitator and scribe. A multidisciplinary team is important in developing realistic threat 
scenarios, assessing the impact of compromise and achieving consensus on realistic likelihood 
values given the threat environment, the known vulnerabilities and existing countermeasures. 
The facilitator and scribe are typically responsible for gathering and organizing all of the 
information required to conduct the workshop (e.g. system architecture diagrams, vulnerability 
assessments, and PHAs) and training the workshop team on the method, if necessary. 
A worksheet is commonly used to document the cyber PHA workshop. Various spreadsheet 
templates, databases and commercial software tools have been developed to support the cyber 
PHA method.  The organization’s risk matrix is typically integrated directly into the worksheet 
to facilitate assessment of severity and likelihood and to look up the resulting risk score.  
The workshop is conducted following a systematic approach where the system is partitioned into 
security zones and each zone is assessed to identify consequences of compromise and the threat 
scenarios that could lead to those consequences.  Each scenario is assigned a risk score where 
risk is defined as the severity of a consequence versus the likelihood of that consequence. 
First, a consequence must be defined. It include a description of what happens as a result of the 
scenario being considered. Typically, a consequence from the site’s process safety PHA is 
selected where a control system failure is the initiator and/or the SIS is the safeguard. 
Additionally, non-safety but high impact financial consequences such as lost production or 
business interruption are also identified. It’s important for the workshop facilitator to be familiar 
with process safety and cybersecurity so these scenarios are legitimate. 
Next, the threat scenarios are defined that could lead to the consequence. The threat scenario 
includes threat actors, threat actions, and the vulnerabilities they may exploit to carry out the 
attack. Unlike the IT environment, cyber threats to the ICS include 3rd party contractors with 
high levels of privilege who may act maliciously or expose the system to non-secure laptops or 
portable media. These threats present a unique case were code can be changed creating safety 
incidents or infesting a system with a site wide malware outbreak causing an extended outage. 
Also, authorized users represent a significant proportion of ICS cyber attacks. These users have 
the potential to intentionally or unintentionally manipulate the controls in unintended ways.  
Once the scenario is defined, the risk can be scored based on the severity of the consequence and 
the likelihood of each threat. Severity scoring uses the same system as a process safety PHA’s. 
However, unlike process safety, there is no database of frequencies for cyber events. Likelihoods 
of threat scenarios are more relative to one another as opposed the more mathematical approach 
used in a process safety PHA. It’s important that the facilitator has an understanding of this so 
the risk isn’t under or over stated. 
With a risk ranked scenario, the current state is documented by recording existing cyber 
countermeasures in place. Then, if required by the residual risk, recommendations are made that 
reduce the risk to acceptable levels. These new recommendations are directly tied to a real risk to 
the organization and are prioritized with the most effective countermeasures reported against the 
highest risk. 
5. Report: Once the Cyber PHA is completed and its results analyzed, a comprehensive 
report is produced showing the risks to the enterprise and a plan to mitigate risk to the 
organization’s acceptable level. A detailed risk profile provides a visual map of what zones in a 
facility contain the highest risk. An executive summary provides the decision makers with a 
concise risk and remediation picture.  
When conducing risk assessments across a number of assets (e.g. all SIS in a facility or 
company), a group of recommendations often become common to all the facilities. These are 
identified as baseline recommendations that become part of the organization’s long term cyber 
remediation plan. 
6. Mitigate: An effective remediation plan includes a prioritized list of actions, budgetary 
estimates, schedule and resource requirements. Typically, these plans include short term projects 
to mitigate high and critical risks and long term projects involving many resources, new 
equipment and training. Enterprises that possess multiple facilities often establish a specific 
project to roll out the baseline risk mitigations identified during the reporting phase.  This phase 
satisfies the requirements in 61511 Clause 11.2.12. 
Conclusion 
We hope that this paper has helped clarify the purpose of performing a security risk assessment 
on a SIS and why it is important.  More importantly, we hope that it has presented you with a 
proven methodology (cyber PHA) that will help you conform with the security requirements in 
61511 as well as provided you with a sensible approach to assessing cyber security risk for any 
control system.  More information on the cyber PHA methodology can be found in the 
whitepaper, “If it isn’t Secure, it isn’t Safe” (Cusimano & Rostick, 2018).  
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